MEMORANDUM

TO: W. W. Haythorn, N. Jordan, W. A. Steger   DATE: 3-2-61

FROM: Daniel Ellsberg   MEMO NO.:   M-1503

SUBJECT: D-8236, "ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON COMMAND
           AND CONTROL RESEARCH

COPIES TO:

1. D-8236 seems to me to be a very useful addition to the growing RAND
   literature on general problems of command and control. I am particu-
   larly struck by the lack of overlap between your Section II, "Questions
   Regarding Command and Control Systems," and other extensive discussions
   of command and control problems, such as my D-7838; this is an indication
   of the breadth and richness of this subject and the need for contributions
   from many disciplines.

2. I have two small comments to make. I believe that the dangers of
   "Type I errors," accidents and unauthorized actions, are dismissed much
   too casually (p. 26). I suspect that the combination of a tense situation,
   a false alarm, and an unauthorized action, is neither unlikely (enough)
   nor insufficient to generate a war. Secondly, I would say that there is
   insufficient attention in your Document to the problem of the goals and
   requirements of a command and control system (see, for example, p. 46).
   The theme of D-7838, which I believe strongly, is that the demands made
   upon command and control systems are very sensitive to the choice of
   goals and strategies. This is less true once one restricts oneself to
   a set of strategies requiring continuing centralized post-attack control
   of operations, but it is unlikely that the "customers" of your simulation
   work would at present so restrict themselves. A simulation which accepted
   the current views of the "customers" as to strategy, objectives, and re-
   quirements, would allow little play for post-attack control. At the
   least, alternatives to a "spasm war" would have to be explored by the
   simulation.

3. I have little feel for the cost-effectiveness aspects of a simulation
   approach, but your discussion is persuasive. I notice that you make
   little mention of the possibility of training high-level military
   commanders in the sort of "decision-making exercises" which SDC has been
   considering. It might be a useful approach to consider developing a
   simulation technique which would be suitable for this purpose.

DE:jc